Federal Income Tax Liability—Exception to Marital Bankruptcy by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 2 
4-1-1966 
Federal Income Tax Liability—Exception to Marital Bankruptcy 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Federal Income Tax Liability—Exception to Marital Bankruptcy, 41 Wash. L. 
Rev. 356 (1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol41/iss2/11 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY -
EXCEPTION TO MARITAL BANKRUPTCY
Mrs. Draper had incurred unpaid federal income tax obligations
prior to her marriage to Delmar Draper, and the Internal Revenue
Service levied on one-half of Mrs. Draper's wages during marriage.
The Drapers brought suit as a marital community to quiet title to the
salary levied on to satisfy the wife's premarital obligation, contending
that the wife's wages were community property and, therefore, not
subject to satisfaction for the premarital debt. Defendant's motion
to dismiss was sustained. Held: One-half of a spouse's wages, even
though community property, can be levied on to satisfy a premarital
federal income tax liability. Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp.
563 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
The non-liability of community property for separate debts has
long been the rule in Washington,' and is popularly designated as
"marital bankruptcy." The question of a premarital income tax obli-
gation had been previously considered by the same district court in
Stone v. United States,2 in which it was concluded that "marital
bankruptcy" was an inherent characteristic of Washington community
property law, and, consequently, the tax lien for the premarital obliga-
tion could not be satisfied from community property. The court in
the principal case was presented with a conflict between the holding
in Stone and considerations of public policy which support collect-
ability of federal income taxes.
The court in the principal case accepted the ruling in Stone that
federal courts should look to state law for determination of property
rights.3 The court noted, however, that the Washington Supreme
Court had created an exception to "marital bankruptcy," based on
grounds of public policy, in allowing a former wife to collect alimony
by garnishing the wages of her former husband, then remarried.4
Reasoning that collection of federal income taxes for the support of
the nation was an equally strong public policy, the court in the prin-
cipal case felt that the further exception to "marital bankruptcy"
I E.g., Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919) ; Schramm v. Steele, 97
Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917) ; Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892);
Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688 (1890).
2225 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
3 Compare Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964), 40 WAsH. L. RPv. 358(1965) (disposition of federal savings bonds, purchased with community funds,
governed by federal law).
4 Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
[VOL. 41
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
was justified. Although the court recognized that Washington may
consider alimony an obligation created by judicial decree rather than
a debt,' it concluded that this distinction did not preclude holding the
community property liable in the principal case. The court reasoned
that a tax obligation was analogous to alimony, in that neither involved
a voluntarily created debt but arose, rather, by operation of law.
Consequently, the conclusion in Stone that the tax lien could not be
levied on community property was rejected, and it was concluded
that a federal tax obligation should be treated as an exception to
"marital bankruptcy."
The court tried to fit the principal case into the exception to
"marital bankruptcy," based upon public policy, which was created
by the Washington court in Fisch v. Marler6 In Fisch, the court had
allowed a divorced wife to collect alimony from a former husband
who had remarried. Thus, although Fisch was an exception to "mari-
tal bankruptcy," it was very narrow in scope. A policy reason for
creating "marital bankruptcy" was to protect the family;' however,
there were two families involved in Fisch-the family of the dissolved
marriage and the new family of the husband-and both required pro-
tection. The court in Fisch concluded that it was necessary to balance
the prior claim of the first wife against the present claim of the second
wife, in order to achieve an equitable result.' While the court in the
principal case recognized that the exception in Fisch was for support
of the family, it argued that such policy was no more important than
support of the nation. This argument may be valid in a general sense,
but it goes beyond the narrow public policy exception necessitated by
the compelling circumstances in Fisch.
Even the narrow exception granted in Fisch has been restricted by
the Washington court. In Stafford v. Stafford9 the court had to decide
See Stafford v. Stafford, 18 Wn. 2d 775, 781, 140 P.2d 545, 548 (1943) ; Haaken-
son v. Coldiron, 190 Vash. 627, 629, 70 P.2d 294, 295 (1937).
(1 Vn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
7 BROCKELBANK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 284 (1962) ; 1 DE FUNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF CO.MMUNITY PROPERTY 441 (1943).
8 1 Vn. 2d 698, 716, 97 P.2d 147, 155 (1939) :
Although the claim of the divorced wife upon the earnings of her former husband
is a fixed and prior one, it is not in all cases to be enforced to the point of
exhaustion of such earnings, for the present wife also has a claim thereon
which is entitled to consideration. Upon a showing by the present wife of
necessitous circumstances, particularly where there is a minor child or children
of the husband's subsequent marriage, the court may make such adjustment and
allocation of the husband's earnings as may appear to it to be just and equitable
in the premises.
0 10 Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941). (This case is to be distinguished from
Stafford v. Stafford, 18 Vn. 2d 775, 140 P.2d 545 (1943), supra note 5.)
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whether the award of a lump sum for alimony in a divorce decree
created a lien upon real property subsequently purchased by a new
marital community. The court in Stafford limited the holding in Fisch
to community personal property, and did not allow the former wife
to levy on the realty, even though the distinction between real and
personal property had been generally abandoned in Washington."°
The use of this distinction in Stafford indicates a reluctance on the
part of the Washington court to make additional exceptions to "marital
bankruptcy."
In a footnote, the court in the principal case cited Electrical Prod-
ucts Consolidated v. Clarke"-an unreported Washington superior
court case-as additional authority for the existence of a "category"
of exceptions based on public policy. In Electrical Products, the
couple involved were divorced and then remarried. They contended
that the "second" community was not liable for a community debt
incurred during the "first" marriage. The court recognized that, if
successful, this method could be used as a substitute for bankruptcy
to free couples from their debts, and properly held the "second"
community liable. The decision in Electrical Products does not pro-
vide authority for a "category" of exceptions based on public policy,
as it is possible that the court had simply recognized that there was
essentially only one marital community with a "dormant period"
between the divorce and remarriage. 2 Thus, it cannot be said that
there is a "category" of exceptions to "marital bankruptcy" based
on public policy, but only a single limited exception that arose from
special circumstances in an alimony case.
In a supplementary argument, the court in the principal case noted
that Washington may consider alimony as an obligation created by
judicial decree rather than as a debt. The court reasoned that, if
this distinction was the basis of the alimony exception to "marital
bankruptcy," then a federal tax obligation should be handled in a
similar manner because it also was created by operation of law. The
court concluded that obligations arising by operation of law are excep-
tions to "marital bankruptcy." There is some support for this position
in Spanish community property law, which Washington has generally
recognized and applied.' 3 Traditional Spanish law distinguished be-
10 See Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917) ; Cross, Community
Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. Rv. 640 (1955).
11 1 Seattle Bar Bulletin, No. 9, p. 4 (April 1958).
12 Ibid.
13 1 DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 435 n.1.
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tween separate contractual debts and separate obligations of law, and
made an exception to the rule of "marital bankruptcy" for the latter.
Professor De Funiak states that, under Spanish law, when the law
imposed an obligation on only one spouse-as for taxes or criminal
fines-that spouse's half share of the community property might be
taken. 4 However, with the exception of alimony, the Washington
court has not made special exceptions to "marital bankruptcy" for
obligations arising by operation of law. On the contrary, in Bergman
v. State' it was held that community property could not be levied
on in satisfaction of a judgment for costs rendered in favor of the
state in a criminal action against the husband. In so holding, the court
in Bergman stated:
If costs be considered as a debt, or civil obligation, it was his debt, not
that of the marital community. It arose out of a criminal prosecution in
which the marital community was not legally concerned, and for the
results of which it was not legally liable."6
In attaching one-half of the wife's wages, the court in the principal
case apparently tried to reach the wife's share of the community
property.' 7 However, community property is held indivisibly in Wash-
ington.' 8 The Washington court has held that, not only is the whole
community property unavailable for satisfaction of a separate debt,
but, in addition, the debtor's undivided half interest cannot be taken.'9
Nor can the community property be involuntarily divided during the
existence of the community.2 9 Consequently, the one-half of the wife's
wages awarded by the decision in the principal case to the govern-
ment was not her "share," but rather that of the marital community.
On dissolution of the community without a property settlement or
award, the remaining community property would be held by the former
spouses as tenants in common. 21 But since half of the wife's "contri-
bution" to the community had been taken by the government in
satisfaction of her separate obligation, the result would be that the
L1 Id. at 468-69.
15 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699 (1936).So Id. at 628, 60 P.2d at 702.
17 This would be effective in jurisdictions in which the community property is
liable for the antenuptial debts of the wife. See Austin v. Crim, 6 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.
Comm. of App. 1928) ; CAL. CIVI CODE § 167. But see Forsythe v. Paschal, 34 Ariz.
380, 271 Pac. 865 (1928). See generally 1 DE FuNiAK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 453-62.
1s i re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 382, 81 P.2d 283, 284 (1938) ; Stockand
v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892). See 40 WASH. L. REv. 358, 360 (1965).
19 Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892). See also 1 DE FUNiAK, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 448-49.
- See Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 731, 31 Pac. 24 (1892).
21 Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90 Pac. 588 (1907).
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wife would end up receiving approximately three-quarters of her
contribution to the community property. Although an adjustment
might be made in the case of a divorce, there could be no adjustment
if the community were terminated by death.22
Implicit in the principal case is a questioning of the validity of
"marital bankruptcy." There is considerable doubt whether "marital
bankruptcy" is suited to modern society, and there have been informal
proposals to eliminate the doctrine.23 "Marital bankruptcy" originated
in the Spanish community property law, in which it was considered that
the well-being and interest of the family were superior to the rights of
creditors. 4 Such a doctrine was appropriate for the social and eco-
nomic environment in which the concepts of community property
developed. The interest and well-being of the family are still signifi-
cant, but the conditions that fostered "marital bankruptcy" may no
longer be present. Government welfare machinery and private charities
provide substantial protection against the consequences of failure to
protect the family. In addition, doctrines that add instability and un-
certainty to credit transactions in a credit-oriented economy are incon-
sistent with the nature of that economy. Although "marital bank-
ruptcy" does not seem well-adapted to the contemporary society, the
proper remedial device is not the creation of ill-defined, piecemeal
exceptions, but rather correction through comprehensive statutory
change.
TAXATION OF CORPORATE STOCK RECEIVED BY
SOLE SHAREHOLDERS UPON CANCELLATION
OF SALARY OBLIGATIONS
Randall and Fender, sole and equal shareholders of Fender Sales,
Inc., twice cancelled equal salary debts owned to them by their corpor-
ation.' As part of these transactions, the corporation issued $100 par
value common stock for each $100 of salary debt owed. Neither the
22 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1958) (divorce), with WASH. REv.
CODE § 11.04.050 (1956) (death).
23 BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 284-85; SPEER, LAW OF MARiTAL RIGHTS
IN TEXAS § 385 (3d ed. 1929) ; Cross, supra note 10, at 667; Cross, Law Revision in
Washington, 27 WASH. L. REv. 193, 196 (1952).2 4 BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 284; DE FuNIAK, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 441.
'The transactions in question grew out of a suggestion by a bank-creditor of the
corporation that its salary liabilities to Randall and Fender be capitalized in order to
avoid potential priority over the bank's claim.
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